Ayman al-Zawahri - New Yorker Magazine

From The New Yorker Magazine

September 16, 2002
The Second Man
Issue of 2002-09-16
Posted 2002-09-16

This week in the NEW YORKER, in "The Man Behind bin Laden," Lawrence Wright profiles Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian-born surgeon who, along with Osama bin Laden, allegedly masterminded last September's terrorist attacks. Wright talked with The New Yorker's Daniel Cappello about Zawahiri's background, his path toward terrorism, and the future of Islamic extremism.

DANIEL CAPPELLO: When did you first hear of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri?

LAWRENCE WRIGHT: Back in 1997, I was doing a lot of research on different terrorist groups around the world for a screenplay that became the movie "The Siege." At that time, I became acquainted with the group Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the name Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian doctor with long experience in underground work. After the events of September 11th, I, along with everyone else, became much more interested in the organizational structure of Al Qaeda. It was apparent that the organization wasn't just about Osama bin Laden-in the videos there was always a formidable and influential figure next to him, and that was Zawahiri. He caught my attention, and I decided to take a look at him.

What did you learn about the relationship between bin Laden and Zawahiri?

Well, they're mutually dependent on each other. Neither would do well without the other. Zawahiri is cunning and experienced; he knows how to run underground cells, from his clandestine experience in Egypt. But he's not bin Laden-he's not charismatic, and he's not a natural leader. People don't want to give up their lives for Zawahiri in the same way they want to for bin Laden. Moreover, bin Laden had money. Zawahiri and his organization were constantly strapped. And so they became dependent on bin Laden.

Were the original goals of Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad identical, or similar?

Zawahiri and Islamic Jihad were Egyptians who sought to overthrow the secular regime in Egypt and replace it with an Islamic theocracy. And that was the entire purpose of the organization, until they became allied with bin Laden, who had a wider agenda.

Do you think bin Laden changed Zawahiri, then?

Certainly, it works both ways. It's interesting to realize that Zawahiri was fifteen years old when he began his underground work. He created a cell in his high school to overthrow the Egyptian government. Think about how amazingly bold that notion is. And he never swerved from that path. He always had that in his mind as the goal of his life, but it proved to be unachievable. Bin Laden had as his aim the removal of American influence from the Middle East. Zawahiri eventually came to subscribe to those goals.

You describe the alliance between Zawahiri's Islamic Jihad and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda, in 2001, as a "merger." How appropriate is that kind of corporate language for the world of terrorism?

Remember, bin Laden was an international businessman. His family's company, the Saudi Binladen Group, was the largest privately held company in Saudi Arabia. He naturally created an organization that was structured along corporate lines, with separate departments and responsibilities. And it proved to be a devastating innovation in the world of terrorism. It's likely to become a model that will be replicated elsewhere. It's a very simple structure. The lines of authority are clear, and it doesn't require much money to operate. It is also truly multinational, in that it can move around and operate in any region. So I think he has taken the business model and very fruitfully applied it to the terrorist enterprise. Charismatic leadership is the key to the extraordinary success of Al Qaeda, but the model itself can function without a single glamorous head.

Are there other leaders you know of who could replace bin Laden or Zawahiri?

There are no ready replacements for bin Laden. For one thing, he's got easy access to money, which helps to lubricate the gears of this operation. Moreover, because of his charisma, and his legendary status, he attracts thousands of followers. There's no obvious candidate to succeed him in that department. Zawahiri is not irreplaceable, but he is very valuable because of his experience.

One of the hardest things for many Americans to understand about September 11th was the educated middle-class background of most of the hijackers. Zawahiri exemplifies this. As you describe it in your piece, he comes from a prominent family of doctors and academics, and holds a medical degree himself. Is this a paradox, or are there reasons that so much anger emanates from this sector of Arab society?

It's not a paradox at all. In fact, I spoke to Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a dissident sociologist in Cairo, who has done a study of Egyptian Islamists, and discovered that they were not the underprivileged, uneducated class that many have assumed. They were what he called "model Egyptians"-young men from middle-class homes, most of them children of government bureaucrats and well educated. These are the people who have made up the core of this movement from its beginning. Zawahiri is not exceptional; if anything, he is typical. As to why this should be the case, I think that political Islam is a kind of bubble that has been created by the lack of democratic outlets in the Middle East. Islamism encompasses many people with various agendas who have no other way of expressing their objections to the authoritarian regimes of the countries they live in, other than by taking refuge under the banner of Islam. I believe that if they had more alternative routes of expression Islamism would diminish to a more modest size. As Americans, we assume that the enemy of tyranny is democracy. But, often in the Middle East, that does not seem to be the case. One of our closest allies in the Middle East is a kingdom, and its enemies are theocrats.

Is there any way to make the war on terror and the fight for democracy a single campaign?

The problem with our policies in the Middle East is that we have gained friends among the governments and lost them among the people. And the war on terror has unfortunately been seized upon by regimes all over the world to suppress dissident political movements-some of which may have genuine and authentic needs. I think that the real danger we are facing in the war on terror lies in being unsophisticated and unsympathetic toward the political aspirations of people who are really struggling in countries that have shut down democratic outlets.

Do you think America has ever fully addressed-or understood-the needs of the people in the Middle East?

In the past, America was idolized in the Middle East. It was seen as a beacon of democratic values, and as a natural ally for people who hoped to achieve a similar model in their own countries. In the past several decades, unfortunately, we have come to represent the opposite of that. Now, instead, we are perceived as the guarantor of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes.

These two men, bin Laden and Zawahiri, now have a mythic quality about them. Did this make it harder for you to report the story? Did you get the sense that everyone had his own bin Laden or his own Zawahiri encounter?

There was really the opposite problem. In Egypt, anyone who even expresses sympathy with terrorist groups is liable to prosecution. So there was a lot of reluctance, even among people who I knew were acquainted with Zawahiri, to admit their connection. Even when I talked to people who were living in Europe-whom I knew, from evidence produced in various trials and subpoenas, to be members of Islamic Jihad-there was always the conceit that they were not actual members but only well-informed sympathizers.

And yet the impression people have here in the United States is that the Arab press has done much to magnify the image of Zawahiri and bin Laden. How sensational is the coverage of the two men in the Middle East, and what effect does it have on their popularity?

I think that among Egyptians, at least, opinion is more nuanced than we tend to give them credit for. Bear in mind that Zawahiri was waging war on the Egyptian regime for a long time before we ever heard of him. The Islamists caused hundreds of deaths in that country alone-thousands might be a better figure-and did immeasurable damage to the Egyptian economy. So the Egyptians know the cost of terror. Despite that, Zawahiri and bin Laden have managed to come to represent-I'm not sure exactly what the right word is-perhaps the Islamic opposition to the reach of American power in the Middle East. Many people would like to see America be less present in that region than it is now.

It's interesting that you say, "Egyptians know the cost of terror," because you suggest in your piece that, ironically, it's in Western countries like the United States that both Egyptian dissidents and terrorists have found refuge. We've heard a lot about how America's freedoms make it vulnerable. Is there a necessary trade-off? Should we be granting asylum to people who are wanted in their own countries?

This is a really thorny issue. We do need to be constantly vigilant about who is allowed to come into the country. On the other hand, it's absolutely crucial that we maintain an open society and make ourselves available to new perspectives. And it's invaluable for us to welcome Middle Eastern Muslim people into our country, so that they can become acquainted with our way of life-so that they can study our system and see what's best in it, and what aspects of it they might use in their own countries. They are our best ambassadors. So the notion of shutting the doors of America to Muslims or to foreign visitors is not only a hostile gesture but a self-defeating one.

What about when that goes wrong? For instance, in your piece, you write about the influence of Sayyid Qutb, who was a leading Egyptian secularist scholar until he actually went to live in America and didn't like what he found. Can you talk some more about how he fits into contemporary Islamic culture?

It's funny how all these great political movements always go back to a book. Whether it's Karl Marx and "Das Kapital," or Lenin's "What Is to Be Done?," or Rousseau, they all have underneath them one defining book, and the work that does that for Islamism is Qutb's book "Milestones." He wrote that book while he was in prison during the Nasser era. The torture that he allegedly endured in prison seems to have helped to harden his views into a much more bitter and militant stance. Bits of his book were smuggled out of prison while he was still alive, and they created a sensation in Egypt. He talked about how even nominally Islamic countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia had gone against the Koran, and how they had no legitimacy and needed to be purified. So suddenly these governments could be attacked by their own citizens for being insufficiently Islamic. Nasser had him hanged in 1966. And that same year, a fifteen-year-old, Ayman al-Zawahiri, established a cell in his high school to overthrow the government, and to carry on Qutb's legacy.

We've heard a lot about how the terrorists' actions had nothing to do with true Islam. You write about the rise of Islamic militancy, and about Khomeini's role in the debate over the religion's future. Can you talk about the state of that debate? Where do you see Islam headed, if one can speak of a single Islam today?

I think it's tied up with the dilemma of the Middle East peace process. As long as the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians remains unresolved, it's going to be very difficult for Islam to truly reform itself and step back from the militancy that it has adopted. It also puts moderate believers at a disadvantage. The furor that is sweeping the Middle East right now about the Palestinians-and also about the American stance against Iraq, and our continuing presence in Saudi Arabia-has so inflamed the situation that the people who are more reasonable and moderate in their beliefs are afraid to speak up. And so the strident voices of Islam-despite the reactions to September 11th, despite the war on terror-are still emboldened.

How well do you think the war on terror is working? And what about the war on Al Qaeda?

I think the war on Al Qaeda is going well. Although there is still no evidence that we've captured or killed the leaders, and the organization is still alive and a threat, I think it is far less of a threat now that it has been wiped out of Afghanistan. It has lost its base. I do expect to hear from Al Qaeda for quite some time, but its future, I think, is limited. The war on terror is a different matter. It has become a global phenomenon: China now has such a war, and, of course, Israel, and countries in Latin America and elsewhere. The question that we seem to be posing is this: Is violent resistance against the status quo always terrorism? Certainly, that's the way many different authoritarian regimes around the world are interpreting our war on terror. And, if that's the way we are defining the war on terror, I don't think we'll win that one.

Where do you think Zawahiri is today? Do you believe he is still alive?

I had hoped to end this story with the revelation of whether he was alive or dead, but, unfortunately, all I can reveal is a great deal of confusion about that matter. Expert sources I've talked to in the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. are divided. Some are certain that he's dead, and others are convinced that he and bin Laden are alive and together, probably still in Afghanistan.

Egypt is a country that you know well. You taught and lived there for many years. When you went back there this last time, was it different being an American? Had the country become less recognizable? Had the reflection you saw of yourself-in Egyptians' eyes-altered?

When I lived in Egypt, from 1969 to 1971, it was a difficult time. The U.S. didn't even have diplomatic relations with the country. There were very few Americans there-maybe three hundred in all of Egypt. But my wife and I felt that we were genuinely welcomed by the people. We have had deep personal ties to that country ever since. When we went back to Cairo this time, we encountered, in a way, the opposite situation. Our diplomatic relations with Egypt are very strong. The American Embassy has a huge presence, and the U.S. underwrites the Egyptian economy to the tune of two billion dollars a year. But the attitude of the people toward America has undergone a deep shift. I really regret the chasm that has arisen between the Egyptian people and our country. It was a difficult time to be in Egypt because of the anger that the Egyptians felt toward America for what they perceived as our backing of their authoritarian government, and our undermining of legitimate Islamic political aspirations. At the same time, there was a huge amount of denial about their own guilt and complicity in the actions of September 11th, which was simply infuriating.

In the future, do you see a return of popular regard for America in Egypt?

I'm not sure how it is going to turn out. The main complaint that the Egyptians I talked to had about America was that we had a double standard. We talk about democratic reforms, and, in many cases, we have helped other countries to institute those reforms. Egyptians can look over their shoulder at Asia, for instance, especially at Southeast Asia and Korea, relatively poor regions suffering from the longtime control of despots, much as the Arab world is today. In the past twenty or thirty years, much of Asia has undergone a great democratic reformation, and has instituted economic reforms that have opened their markets and allowed those countries to prosper. None of that has happened in Egypt. So they wonder why America helped those other countries to become democracies and didn't have the same standards for the Middle East. They answer that question by saying that we are interested only in oil and in pursuing our own selfish gains in that region. And that's a difficult argument to counter.

What is the solution, if there is one?

I think the solution is to offer them help in reforming their political systems-and their economies-by urging democratic reforms all over the region. We're afraid of the consequences, which is why we haven't done that. But I think the consequences of creating civil society and democratic governments are consequences we can live with. Whatever they are.

September 16, 2002

From the New Yorker Magazine

Zawahiri's Whereabouts
by Lawrence Wright
Issue of 2002-09-16
Posted 2002-09-13

While the American intelligence community continues to debate whether Al Qaeda's leaders are dead or alive, the latest reports concerning Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the top lieutenant of Osama bin Laden, have taken an unexpected turn. Zawahiri, an Egyptian-born surgeon who presided over Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization that merged with bin Laden's Al Qaeda in June, 2001, has been reported on at least two occasions to have been killed. Now, though, there are new reports that he is not only alive but remarried; according to a London-based observer of the Islamic fundamentalist movement, he recently married two widows of a deceased comrade in a ceremony at an undisclosed location.

Hany al-Sibai, the director of the al-Maqrizi Center for Historical Studies and a man who the F.B.I. alleges is a former member of Islamic Jihad (he denies this allegation), told the London Arabic-language newspaper Al-Hayat that Zawahiri married the two women after the death of his own wife, Azza Nowair, and two of his six children in an American bombing raid on a fortified cave complex near Jalalabad last winter. Sibai said that Zawahiri's son and one of his daughters were killed in the raid, but that at least two daughters escaped. Sibai also said that he had received confirmed information from several sources that Zawahiri was in good health.

A follow-up article in Al-Hayat related that the two women Zawahiri reportedly married, Amima Ahmad Hassan and Sayida Halawa, had been the wives of Tariq Anwar, one of Zawahiri's top lieutenants, who died in the American bombing raids last fall. Halawa had previously been married to Ahmed al-Najjar, a prominent leader of Islamic Jihad, who was executed in Egypt in 1999. According to Sibai, the women escaped from Kandahar before it fell to troops of the Northern Alliance. Three months after Zawahiri sent for them, the women joined and married him, and are currently living with him and other Arab veterans of the war in Afghanistan. A source at the F.B.I. told me that he found the report plausible, adding that the practice of marrying the widows of fallen comrades is a form of social welfare among Muslims.

The announcement in Al-Hayat seems to have been timed to appear on the first anniversary of September 11th. It comes at a time when remaining members of Al Qaeda have been making a number of overtures to the press to suggest that its leaders are still alive. Two members of the organization, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, reportedly met with a journalist for Al Jazeera, the Arabic-language network, and claimed that Osama bin Laden was alive and watching the news on television. Another broadcast carried what sounded like bin Laden's voice reciting the names of the nineteen hijackers, although there was no way of knowing exactly when it had been recorded. And, even if Zawahiri is alive, he has been known in the past to employ tactics of misinformation. Zawahiri was last seen in a video broadcast on Al Jazeera in April; although it purported to be new footage, American intelligence officials believe that the video was actually shot last December.